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MISSION AND SCOPE: The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center 
(IATPC) was established in 1990 in the Food and Resource Economics Department 
(FRED) of the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of 
Florida. Its mission is to provide information, education, and research directed to 
immediate and long-term enhancement and sustainability of international trade and 
natural resource use. Its scope includes not only trade and related policy issues, but also 
agricultural, rural, resource, environmental, food, state, national and international 




 The Center’s objectives are to: 
 
•  Serve as a university-wide focal point and resource base for research on 
international agricultural trade and trade policy issues 
•  Facilitate dissemination of agricultural trade related research results and 
publications 
•  Encourage interaction between researchers, business and industry groups, 
state and federal agencies, and policymakers in the examination and 
discussion of agricultural trade policy questions 
•  Provide support to initiatives that enable a better understanding of trade and 
policy issues that impact the competitiveness of Florida and southeastern 
agriculture specialty crops and livestock in the U.S. and international markets   3
ABSTRACT:  Much has been written about the challenges facing CARICOM as a result of 
the liberalization, globalization and integration phenomena.  This paper adds value to the 
conversation by addressing the nexus between and among economic asymmetries, trade 
liberalization and economic integration, as it relates to CARICOM as small developing 
economies.  The paper seeks to highlight the salient issues of CARICOM economic 
adjustment challenges under trade liberalization and integration imperatives, particularly 
as they may be subjected to the constraints of economic asymmetries.  In doing so, it 
steps away from the conventional approach of reciting a series of data usually associated 
with the issues and instead, engages in commentary and assessment regarding the 
changing economic landscape in the Region and elsewhere.  The issues are indeed very 
complex and the arguments and conclusions flowing from this type of evaluation may not 
be in lock-step with the conventional wisdom.  However, it is our contention that the 
regional trade and development policy solutions does not lie in denial of the existence of 
the problems; but rather, in tackling them head-on and incorporating them into existing 
and proposed systems of economic relations.   4
ECONOMIC ASYMMETRIES, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND INTEGRATION: 
ISSUES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR CARICOM COUNTRIES
1 
 




Multilateralism has emerged as the dominant feature in recent global trade policies in lieu 
of bilateral and preferential agreements between countries.  The establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 gave credence to this trend and many 
countries have benefited substantially since its inception.  Inclusion in the international 
trading framework is particularly important for developing nations if they are to likewise 
benefit, since participation in liberalized trade has often been touted as a necessary (if not 
sufficient) condition for long run economic growth and development.  The potential gains 
appear most lucrative in terms of increased export opportunities arising from trade policy 
reform concerning products of existing and prospective interest to developing nations.  
Quota elimination, tariffication on non-tariff barriers (NTBs), tariff reduction, 
agricultural trade reform, and increased bindings on developing country exports are some 
of the mechanisms that are expected to favor trade prospects for the vast majority of 
participants in the trading regime (Dornbusch, 1992). 
 
The Uruguay Round of the GATT/WTO embodies the most comprehensive global trade 
policy agenda to date. Its salient aspects include, among other things: (1) reciprocal 
multilateral trade agreements based on prohibition of non-tariff barriers and the 
progressive reduction of tariffs; (2) market-driven imperatives and performance-based 
results; (3) increased cooperation at the regional and sub-regional levels oriented toward 
open regionalism; (4) linkages between trade and other economic and non-economic 
areas of liberalization such as finance and investment, skilled workers and management 
and; (5) contractual obligation between parties with respect to predictability and certainty 
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th West Indies Agricultural Economics Conference, 
Grenada, West Indies, July 9-12, 2002.
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of agreements (Davis et al., 2001).  These rules are applicable to all member countries of 
the WTO. 
 
It is increasingly apparent however, that specialized multilateral policies may be 
necessary for proper incorporation of developing nations into the WTO liberalized trade 
framework.  It is now an accepted fact that total compliance with WTO rules requires a 
multidimensional infrastructure to facilitate the process.  From our perspective however, 
it is difficult to think of any single dimension more contentious to the incorporation of 
developing nations into the WTO trade regime than the existence of economic 
asymmetries among WTO member countries.  Within the multilateral trading system, 
economic asymmetries are generally viewed in an abstract sense as disparities in levels of 
development among countries.  However, conceptually speaking, asymmetry is a much 
broader and flexible designation than that of the concept of Alevel of development.”   
SELA (1997) argues that the former A...can be used to compare specific sectors or aspects 
within a country or between countries, as well as of the relations among them@ (p.5).  It 
should be apparent however, that there is a close relationship between basic asymmetries 
and levels of development.  It is within the context of this associated relationship that 
economic asymmetries function as serious impediments to equitable trade relations 
among countries at different levels of development (Briguglio, 1995; Bardouille, 2000). 
 
The fact that economic asymmetries exist and is pervasive globally is not a point of 
contention (UNDP, 1998).  Although economic asymmetries are multi-faceted, it is none-
the-less true that the most frequently mentioned dimensions of the phenomena relate to: 
(1) production structure; (2) human resources training; and (3) infrastructure (SELA, 
1997).  The generalized global response to these three dimensions has historically been 
via the principle and operational mechanisms of Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT) within the spheres of trade, finance, and cooperation.  However, under the 
umbrella of the WTO trade regime, the principle and operational modality of reciprocity 
has taken center stage and has been legally sanctioned and enshrined in legal agreements 
and obligations.  On the other hand, while SDT has not been revoked or abandoned in 
multilateral trade relations, it has been relegated to a discretionary status.  The net effect 
is that unlike reciprocity as a modality of trade, SDT lacks legal force and predictability 
(SELA, 1997). 
 
The convergence of issues surrounding economic asymmetries, trade liberalization, and 
global/regional integration, takes on special significance for Caribbean Community and   6
Common Market (CARICOM) countries as small developing economies.
3  To be sure, 
size in all of its dimensions (economies of scale, economies of scope, geographical, etc.) 
is a key element of all three indicator dimensions of economic asymmetries pointed out 
earlier.  In short, size is a dynamic force shaping the configuration of countries= 
production structure, infrastructure, and human resource quality (Bernal, 1994; 
Armstrong and Read, 1998; Davis et. al., 2001).  Of the 193 small economies worldwide, 
CARICOM is a microcosm of this situation.  By virtue of size alone, structural 
dimensions of the region have proven to be problematic in terms of planned transition 
into rules-based trade, owing to the existence of extra and intra-regional economic 
asymmetries.  To compensate, member states have been the beneficiary of a number of 
preferential/nonreciprocal trading agreements with several industrialized nations (Lomé 
Convention; CBI; CARIBCAN).  WTO statutes mandate that such arrangements are 
antithetical to liberalized trade and thus provide a platform for revocation.  Should this 
occur, structural adjustment might be difficult.  Two key questions that are being debated 
within (and outside) of this trading bloc are: (1) Can the region effectively compete 
without preferential status? and (2) What policies must the region undertake to minimize 
adjustment costs and maximize gains?  These two questions rank high among the 
pertinent issues that must be addressed by regional policy agenda and WTO and Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) protocols. 
 
Much has been written about the challenges facing CARICOM as a result of the 
liberalization, globalization and integration phenomena.  This paper adds value to the 
conversation by addressing the nexus between and among economic asymmetries, trade 
liberalization and economic integration, as it relates CARICOM as small developing 
economies.  This paper seeks to highlight the salient issues of CARICOM economic 
adjustment challenges under trade liberalization and integration imperatives, particularly 
as they may be subjected to the constraints of economic asymmetries.  In doing so, it 
steps away from the conventional approach of reciting a series of data usually associated 
                                                 
3CARICOM countries include: Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas (a member of the 
Community, but not the Common Market); Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; 
Guyana; Montserrat; Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines; Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname.  Haiti is formalizing arrangements to 
complete its full entry; it does not yet apply the trade policy.  Associate Members are: 
British Virgin Islands; and Turks and Caicos Islands.  Observer States are: Anguilla, 
Dominican Republic; Netherlands Antilles; Puerto Rico; and Venezuela.  Within 
CARICOM, the smaller states are recognized as a subgroup, the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS).  It includes: Antigua and Barbuda; Dominica; Grenada; 
Montserrat; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
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with the issues and instead, engages in commentary and assessment regarding the 
changing economic landscape in the Region and elsewhere.  The issues are indeed very 
complex and the arguments and conclusions flowing from this type of evaluation my not 
be in lock step with the conventional wisdom.  However, it is our contention that the 
regional trade and development policy solutions do not lie in denial of the existence of 
the problems.  In this regard, we are in complete agreement with the SELA (1997) 
argument that solutions A...lies in tackling it head-on and incorporating it definitively into 
the system of economic relations that is set up@ (p. 16). 
 
TRENDS IN TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND INTEGRATION 
Since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, 
significant progress has been made toward the creation of a global economy.  Each 
successive Round of the GATT has deepened liberalization on a global scale, and sought 
greater integration of developed and developing nations.  In recent years, developing 
countries have opted for outward-looking (exports-promotion) policies, as opposed to 
inward-looking (import-substitution) schemes as strategies for economic development 
and poverty alleviation (OECD, 1992; World Bank, 1996).  According to the 
conventional wisdom, trade liberalization is perhaps best facilitated through economic 
integration, which involves the harmonization of global policies.  As conceptualized by 
Balassa (1961), economic integration is both state B where discriminatory polices are 
eliminated between economies; and a process B where measures are implemented to 
remove such elements.  Trade liberalization policies are technically defined in terms of 
the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to make trading systems between countries 
more open or neutral along a trade liberal/non-liberal continuum (Bhagwati, 1998; Davis 
et. al., 2001).  In the case of both liberalization and economic integration, the 
establishment of economic linkages between entities is essential to the achievement of 
common goals. 
 
Molle (1997) demonstrated the two major aspects that are involved in economic 
integration.  The first aspect entails the integration of product and factor markets through 
Free Trade Areas (FTAs), customs unions, and common markets.
4  The second aspect 
                                                 
4Current literature uses liberalized trade and free trade synonymously.  Strictly 
defined, free trade refers to trade without restrictions, whereas liberalized trade is a 
lessening of trade restrictions.  In highlighting the differences between the two concepts, 
Ballayram and Davis (1997), show that public policy intervention is absent from free 
trade, unlike liberalized trade.  Within FTA, trade within the group is duty free; but each 
member can set its own duty rates on imports from non-members.  Within a custom   8
involves policy consolidation between nations to concretize the union.  It is typical for 
the latter to include the formation of supranational entities through which monetary, 
fiscal, and social policies are harmonized. 
 
Most countries in the world are members of some form of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs).  At the end of the year 2000, there were over 200 RTAs recorded as providing 
notice to the GATT/WTO over time.  According to WTO data (WTO, 2001b), there are 
currently 150 agreements in force, with the majority being concluded in the past 10 years.  
Of some significance however, is the fact that since 1995, over 100 agreements in goods 
and/or services have been notified to the WTO.  Also, many countries hold multiple-
agreement membership, and in many instances, there are differences in rules among 
agreements.  WTO data (2001b) also shows that 60 percent of the notified RTAs in force 
in 2000 were among European countries.  In contrast, roughly 15 percent of the total 
number of RTAs was among developing countries.  It should be noted that within the 
context of the WTO regime, RTAs are not confined to countries belonging to the same 
geographical area.  However, from a factual standpoint, RTAs are organized according to 
geographical location. 
 
An increasing number of agreements are in existence in the Western Hemisphere.  For 
example, South American nations participate in the Andean Group, the Southern Cone 
Common Market (MERCUSOR), and the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA), which encompasses both groups.  Likewise, trade between Central American 
nations is governed by the Central American Common Market (CACM).  Since the 
1970s, Caribbean countries have participated in an RTA called CARICOM and more 
recently, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which is a subgroup of 
the smaller Eastern Caribbean states country grouping within this trading agreement.   
Countries within these groupings were defined earlier.  Prior to 1994, the United States 
and Canada traded via the Canada-US Trade Agreement (CUSTA); in 1994, it was 
subsumed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which also includes 
Mexico.  There exists considerable overlap in some cases, as in the Group of Three (G-3) 
arrangement between Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia.  This is indicative of countries= 
aims to maximize economic benefits under these arrangements.  Table 1 shows selected 
economic indicators for some of the many Western Hemisphere trading arrangements 
(Caribbean Publishing Company, 2002). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
union, all members charge the same set of customs duty rates on imports from non-
members.
   9
Tremendous interest has also been demonstrated with respect to the proposed 
hemispheric RTA, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that will be fully 
implemented by 2005.  Some 34 countries are expected to participate, and its specific 
goals will include: (1) trade liberalization; (2) elimination of investment restrictions; (3) 
freer movement of specialized workers; (4) harmonization of tax and monetary policies; 
and (5) the creation of a supra-regional institution for administrative purposes (Davis et 
al, 2001).  According to the World Bank (2000), the reasons for regionalism are both 
political and economic in scope.  Increased security, greater bargaining power accruing 
from increased size, and the advancement of government agenda through commitment 
mechanisms  inter alia are common political reasons.  Key economic considerations 
pertain to "scale and competition" effects, which evaluate increases in market size and 
scale efficiencies; and "trade location" effects, which assess trade creation and diversion, 
and resource redistribution.     
 
The motivation for regionalism appears to differ between developed and developing 
countries.  For example, the US has actively participated in various agreements with the 
following objectives in mind: (1) to address the relative decline in its economic and 
technological position; (2) dissatisfaction with GATT=s ability to further US interests; and 
(3) the formation of the European Union (EU).  One may characterize this behavior as 
>trade seeking=.  In contrast, economic survival appears to be the impetus for Latin 
America and Caribbean countries.  Increased market access, foreign investment, and 
negotiating power are among the primary goals given in this regard (Bouzas and Ros, 
1994).  It should be recognized however, that the benefits of regionalism might not be 
readily apparent in some instances.  Analyses of economic integration arrangements and 
their associated trade liberalization components tend to focus on net welfare effects via 
estimates of trade creation and diversion impacts. 
 
In reference to the proposed FTAA, Singer (1995) alluded to the difficulty in ascertaining 
such impacts.  In spite of this problem, there appears to be movement toward some 
consensus regarding the overall positive effects of such movements.  For example, 
analysis by Burfisher (1998) shows RTAs have greater trade creation effects where: (1) 
larger unit production costs differences exist within the RTA; (2) smaller cost differences 
exist between members and nonmembers; (3) higher pre-RTA tariffs, and lower post-
RTA tariffs exist between the RTA and nonmembers; (4) larger trade flows occur 
between  natural trade partners; (5) the member country=s supply and demand 
responsiveness is greater and; (6) the pre-RTA structure of members= economies is more 
competitive.    It should also be noted that in this type of analysis, the following factors 
stand out: (1) differences in production costs; (2) relative supply and demand responses; 
and (3) initial tariff rates.  According to the Burfisher (1998) finding, where these factors   10
diverge  considerably between countries, there is increased potential for considerable 
gains. Similar conclusions were arrived at by Robinson and DeRosa (1995), whose 
evaluation of several RTAs indicated a greater likelihood for trade creation as opposed to 
trade diversion.  However, according to these studies, positive effects were guaranteed 
only if countries desisted from erecting formal trade barriers for non-member countries 
(Burfisher, 1998; Robinson and DeRosa, 1995). 
 
Dornbusch (1992) and Haveman et al. (2001) discussed the various benefits accruing 
from trade liberalization and integration initiatives for developing nations within a 
globalized framework.  According to their assessment, improvements in resource 
allocation, and increased access to markets and technologies are major benefits that could 
fuel economic growth and development to these countries.  However, they also concluded 
that these impacts are usually not readily discernable from empirical estimating models, 
due to the myriad factors affecting growth.  The lack of an internationally comparable 
indicator of economic openness is another constraint.  Recently, this latter issue has been 
receiving increased attention in the economics literature, particularly with respect to the 
impacts of economic reforms in developing countries (Ballayram, 2001). 
 
An Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, 1997) study raised the issue regarding the 
Aappropriateness@ of economic reform measures as they reflect indicators of openness and 
other aspects of country liberalization initiatives.  This particular study (IDB, 1997) 
points out that economic data sets such as exchange rate differentials, inflation rates, tax 
structure and so on, deal with outcomes rather than the policies that give rise to them.  In 
other words, it is argued that from a policy analysis perspective, these variables provide 
limited information regarding the impacts of structural policy mechanisms on the growth 
and development process in developing countries.  We argue here that these structural 
policy variables assume high levels of economic relevance within the context of the 
impacts of economic asymmetries as they relate to liberalization and integration.  In an 
attempt to address this issue, Lora (1997) developed structural policy indices for twenty 
Latin American and Caribbean countries in an attempt to measure the degree of market 
freedom (openness), as reflected in country economic policies.  Methodologically, the 
indices are developed for areas covering: (1) trade; (2) taxation; (3) finance; (4) 
privatization; and (5) labor.  In each of the five areas indices of market freedom 
(openness) are estimated.  The structural policy index is a simple average of the indices in 
the five areas.  The index can take on a value of zero to one, where 0 and 1 are the worst 
and best observations respectively, on market freedom in a particular country. 
 
From the perspective of economic liberalization, the structural policy index is useful in 
providing some indicator of the degree to which countries are departing from past ways   11
of operating their economies.  Also from the perspective of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, these indices suggest the relative degree of progress in market 
freedom  (openness) achieved by Caribbean countries vis-à-vis other Latin American 
countries.  Specifically, the computed indices shows that Jamaica, a CARICOM member 
country, registered the highest and continuous movement in market freedom among the 
twenty Latin American and Caribbean countries studied over the 1985-1995 period.  The 
index for Jamaica was 0.426 in 1985; but increased to 0.684 in 1995.  These values are 
higher than the average reported for the other countries in the sample (Lora, 1997).   
These estimates offer some additional evidence that the existence of liberalization, 
economic integration, and economic asymmetries are moving in lock step with each other 
and as such, would be better addressed together within a policy framework. 
 
It is now quite clear that once countries are involved in RTAs that their economies, 
sectors, and firms must adjust quickly to increased competitive forces.  Wherever such 
adjustments fails to occur, short run losses in government revenue, industries dislocation, 
rising unemployment, among other things, are the typical results.  Although welfare 
economics theory generally assumes compensation of >losers= by the >winners=, in reality, 
it is difficult to establish the required mechanisms for such adjustments to take place.  As 
a result, the reality is that some members will benefit at the expense of others  (Balassa, 
1961).  In a worst-case scenario, economic liberalization/ integration may widen the gap 
between trading partners, particularly if the aforementioned compensatory/adjustment 
mechanisms are lacking.  Once again, we reaffirm our earlier proposition that economic 
asymmetries are not neutral with respect to the impact of liberalization and integration 
regimes.  We further propose that from both theoretical and operational modality 
perspectives, compensatory/adjustment mechanisms are appropriate policy measure when 




5  was created on July 4 1973 by the Treaty of Chaguaramas signed in 
Trinidad.  Encompassing 14 countries, it has a total population of about 6.5 million and a 
combined GDP of approximately US$22 billion.  Regional per capita GDP is roughly 
US$2,800.  Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide a listing of selected economic indicators for 
CARICOM countries.   The data contained in the tables demonstrates,  among other 
things: (1) the disparity between these indicators and those of other Western Hemisphere 
                                                 
5 See footnote 3 for country composition of CARICOM.
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Countries
6 and (2) disparity among CARICOM countries themselves.  It is our contention 
that these disparities taken together are tangible evidence of economic asymmetries with 
respect to: (1) production structure; (2) human resources; and (3) infrastructure.  These 
asymmetries serve to mute or blunt the potential positive gains accruing from reciprocity-
based liberalized trade and integration movements. 
 
CARICOM governments have viewed regionalism as an important precondition for 
greater inclusion into the global economy, and have gradually eliminated intra/extra 
regional trade restrictions in accordance with liberalized trade schemes.  Such reforms 
have led to substantial increases in trade as a percentage of GDP, despite greater import 
dependency (Tables 2). 
 
There are three stated objectives of CARICOM as a regional integration mechanism.  
These are: (1) fostering of economic cooperation through the CARICOM Single Market 
and Economy (CSME); (2) coordination of foreign policy among independent Member 
States and; (3) provision of common services and cooperation in functional matters such 
as health, education and culture, communication and, industrial relations (CARICOM 
Secretariat, 2002a).  These objectives have historically been pursued under the regional 
integration/development strategy known as open regionalism.  Briefly described, this 
approach involves the synchronization of transitional arrangements via negotiations 
among a number of trading blocs (Davis et al., 2001; Gill, 1997).  It should be noted that 
the CSME operational modality of the regional integration strategy is a work-in-progress.  
At the present time there are nine Protocols articulating the platform of the mechanism.  
CARICOM countries are at different stages of signing onto these nine Protocols 
(CARICOM Secretariat, 2002b).  It should be pointed out that there are two (albeit 
complementary) components to the regional CSME strategy.  One aspect is the Single 
Market (SM) dimension which is described as A...an arrangement which allows 
CARICOM goods, services, people and capital to move throughout the Caribbean 
Community without tariffs and without restrictions to achieve a single large economic 
space, and to provide for a common Economic and Trade Policy@.  Another dimension is 
the  Single Economy (SE) which is described as A...an arrangement which further 
harmonizes economic, monetary and fiscal policies and measures across all Member 
States of the Caribbean Community to underpin the sustainable development of the 
Region@ (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002b). 
                                                 
6 Readers interested in comparative data for other Western Hemisphere countries 
can consult: Caribbean Publishing Co., 2002; CIA, 2001: UNCTAD, 2000; UNDP, 1998; 
World Bank, 2001.
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Under the CSME initiative, concerted efforts are being made to specialize in key areas 
where comparative advantages exist, such as the tourism and information services 
sectors.  Success in these areas is viewed as not necessarily a function of size, but more 
so of competitiveness.  In 1998, these sectors contributed roughly 40 percent to GDP, up 
15 percent from 1994 (Stotsky et al., 2000).  In contrast, other export sub-sectors within 
agriculture and manufacturing have not been as successful.  Reductions in the Common 
External Tariff (CET) have negatively affected revenue earnings.  Moreover, the erosion 
of preferences, increased competition from NAFTA, and devastation of natural disasters 
have taken their toll on competitiveness and market share in external markets.  It should 
be pointed out however, that reductions in the CET have benefited CARICOM in terms 
of consumer welfare and investment.  It has led to an overall decrease in domestic prices 
of import items, and thereby encouraged greater availability of consumer goods.  Lower 
tariffs have also resulted in intra-regional investment.  Specifically, total regional and 
foreign direct investment grew 2.5 percent between 1994 and 1998.  Given their strong 
correlation with production costs, such improvements have been particularly evident in 
the manufacturing sectors of Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad & Tobago (Stotsky et al., 
2000).    
 
Despite these successes however, Caribbean leaders have grown increasingly concerned 
with CARICOM=s competitive position within the WTO and the FTAA regimes.  They 
recognize the possibility for tremendous loss, particularly if preferences are completely 
eliminated.  Fears of marginalization are legitimate, since the current level of economic 
asymmetries in all major dimensions within the CARICOM territory poses as effective 
constraints to realization of the touted large economic gains from unrestricted 
liberalization.  As argued earlier, since liberalization and integration are joint products, it 
becomes incumbent upon policy makers to address issues of asymmetry, liberalization 
and integration together in trade negotiations. 
 
EXPLORING THE ASYMMETRIES, LIBERALIZATION, AND  INTEGRATION  NEXUS: THE 
CARICOM PERSPECTIVE 
 
Historical Approaches to Asymmetries 
It was pointed out earlier that the traditional approach to dealing with issues of economic 
asymmetries has been via the principle and practice of Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT).  It was also pointed out that despite the tendency to discuss SDT primarily within 
the context of trade issues, the fact of the matter is that it has been extensively applied in 
areas of financing, investments, and development cooperation.  SDT mechanisms have   14
been in existence within Western Hemisphere trade and integration arrangements since 
the early 1960s.  SELA (1997) provides documentation of ten instances where this 
mechanism has been formally enshrined in regional trading agreements in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, dating back to 1960.  CARICOM is included among the ten trading 
arrangements, where special reference is made to the distinction made between the More 




SELA (1997) also points out that SDT has been extensively applied at the extra-regional 
level toward Latin American and Caribbean countries.  Examples cited are: (1) 
preferential treatment extended to Central American and Caribbean countries under the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), by the United States and (2) by Canada to the 
Caribbean countries via the Caribbean-Canada Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN); (3) by 
the United States to all countries of the region (except Cuba) via the Generalized System 
of Trade Preferences (GSP); (4) by the EU to Caribbean members of the Africa-
Caribbean-Pacific Group (ACP) via the LOMÉ Convention and the GSP, and; (5) by the 
EU to Latin American countries via the GSP.  Examples of the extension of SDT to the 
area of finance are cited for: (1) the practice within the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) of providing grants loans exclusively to Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, based on development level criteria and; (2) the World Bank at the 
international level; financing only developing countries and providing grants 
concessional loans exclusively to low income countries through its International 
Development Association (IDA) arm. 
 
We pointed out earlier, that under the WTO trade regime, SDT has not been revoked or 
abandoned.  Instead, it has been relegated to a discretionary status, while the principle of 
reciprocity has been given legal status.  Within the context of the WTO therefore, SDT 
principle and modality are left to the discretion of the developed members of the 
approximate 143-member organization.  Thus far, this discretionary status has been 
manifested almost exclusively in terms of an extended transitional adjustment period to 
the less developed members of the WTO, with respect to liberalization and reciprocity 
commitments (Ballayram and Davis, 1997; Davis, et al., 2001; Michalopolus, 2000).   
Davis, et al. (2001) points out that the five foundation liberalization and integrations 
                                                 
7The designated MDCs are: (1) Barbados; (2) Guyana; (3) Jamaica; (4) Trinidad 
and Tobago and; (5) Suriname.  The LDCs are: (1) Antigua and Barbuda; (2) Belize; (3) 
Dominica; (4) Grenada; (5) St. Kitts and Nevis; (6) St. Lucia and; (7) St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines.
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mechanisms of the proposed Western Hemisphere RTA (the FTAA), takes the process 
well beyond the traditional reciprocity concept among trading partners.  If such a concept 
receives sanction by the WTO, then this would facilitate the up-front treatment of 
economic asymmetries in hemispheric trade arrangements.  However at present, we see 
little predisposition in this direction on the part of the WTO.  Furthermore, the United 
States as the dominant partner in the FTAA is firmly holding its ground on the reciprocity 
issue. 
 
We think it is enlightening to the discussion of SDT and that of reciprocity, to 
differentiate between conditions giving rise to SDT and the performance outcomes of 
SDT.  SELA (1997) rightfully points out that the former should relate conceptually and 
operationally to the problem of categories and graduation; while the latter should relate 
to the effective use of SDT as developmental mechanism and not to reciprocity.  As such, 
SDT is enshrined in the factual existence of economic asymmetries among countries.  It 
is thus a classification category, which sets certain countries apart from others.  SDT  for 
developing nations was established by the Articles of Part IV of the GATT in 1965.  The 
concept of non-reciprocity was later introduced in 1979 under the Enabling Clause of the 
Tokyo Round which stipulates that >developing economies must not be expected to 
provide reciprocity for concessions made in trade agreements, nor are they expected to 
make concessions that are inconsistent with their development, trade or financial needs= 
(OECD, 1992; Bardouille, 2000).  Consequently, developing nations have been exempt 
from the fundamental principles/commitments of the WTO/GATT system, which include 
reciprocity, transparency, national treatment, most-favored nation (MFN) status, 
nondiscriminatory and predictability through binding of negotiated concessions.   
Consequently, a two-tiered system has evolved between contracting parties.  The first tier 
is applicable to developed nations and requires full compliance with WTO stipulations.  
In contrast, the second tier exempts developing countries from WTO obligations, and 
allows special and differential treatment.  We provided earlier examples of some of these 
arrangements within the Western Hemisphere. 
 
The value of SDT in international trade has been challenged since its intended goals 
(infant industry protection and balance of payments stabilization) have not been fully 
realized (OECD, 1992; Michalopoulos, 2000).  Rather, it appears that recipients have 
been disadvantaged in two main areas.  For example, strong reliance on non-reciprocal 
arrangements has effectively barred countries from negotiations that involve their own 
exports.  As such,  tariff levels are disproportionately higher on developing country 
exports, while developed nations have managed to secure major concessions on their 
products.  Furthermore, preferential treatment appears to have hindered economic   16
development in some respects by encouraging rent seeking,
8 resource misallocation, and 
stagnant productivity. 
 
Such evidence lends support to WTO mandates that explicitly forbid preferential 
treatment in international trade, except as provided under its exemption and special 
waiver clause.  However, SELA (1997) challenges the conventional wisdom regarding 
the inherent non-performance bias of SDT mechanisms.  Specifically, it argues that the 
lack of results obtained through SDTs have been due to the development difficulties of 
the countries of the region (Latin America and the Caribbean) and the weaknesses of the 
integration schemes rather than to the characteristics of the mechanisms adopted.  The 
SELA document provides an interesting and informative discussion on the development 




Within the context of CARICOM as small developing countries, a critical question has to 
do with the potential short and long-run impacts of the elimination of SDT on the region=s 
already struggling economy.  Empirical studies indicate that short-run economic 
instability is possible from such action (McIntyre and Gonzales, 2000).  Yamazaki (1996) 
estimated aggregate losses of US $632 million (1992 dollars) due to preference erosion 
between developing countries and the US, the EU and Japan.  Central America and the 
Caribbean were projected to lose US$58 million B approximately 19 percent of their total 
pre-WTO benefits from the US and EU markets.  Although these impacts may seem 
minor in comparison to other countries, Davis et al. (2001) points out that the economic 
significance cannot be disregarded.  The high dependency on preferential agreements 
could very well trigger tremendous losses in all sectors.  Market loss, reduced economic 
benefits, and increased price variability would seriously undermine progress for the most 
vulnerable economies. 
 
CARICOM member states possess certain structural/institutional characteristics giving 
rise to asymmetries that could limit trade competitiveness and heighten their vulnerability 
to disruption by external factors.  Specific examples of these asymmetries include, small 
                                                 
8Rent seeking refers to the waste of resources to society at large to capture (or 
create) the private benefits and/or to avoid (or to prevent) the private costs resulting from 
actual (or potential) government policy or institutional settings (See, deGorter et al., 
2001; Just, et al., 1982).
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size, disaster proneness, insularity, environmental fragility, and a high dependency on 
foreign assistance.  Without the assistance of SDT, these will undoubtedly have important 
implications for the region.  In the case of CARICOM, size is problematic for the 
following reasons: 
 
ECONOMIC OPENNESS: Here, high ratios of trade to GDP, and strong correlation 
between domestic and import prices are key indicators.  These arise from the 
inherent inability of the domestic market to support certain types of production, 
whether due to limited natural/technological resource endowment, and/or low 
inter-industry linkages. Foreign exchange earnings and trade taxes generally 
constitute significant proportions of government revenue.  For example, in St. 
Lucia and Belize, trade taxes comprise more than 50 percent of total government 
revenue (Bernal, 2000). 
EXPORT CONCENTRATION IN FEW MARKETS:  Since export diversification is 
generally infeasible for small economies, they are highly dependent on a narrow 
range of goods and services within very few markets.  Within the OECS Sub-
Region of CARICOM, the Windward Island banana sector is a prime example of 
this phenomenon.  In this context, the UK imports roughly 80-90 percent of the 
exports.  Such strong linkage increases CARICOM=s vulnerability to unfavorable 
economic conditions and policies in overseas markets.  The banana dispute has 
become one of the most contentious trade issues confronting the WTO. 
LIMITATIONS OF IMPORT  SUBSTITUTION  SCHEMES:  These strategies are 
generally ineffective for small economies, and may hinder sustainable economic 
development by encouraging higher domestic prices, inferior quality products, 
and parallel markets in foreign products (Briguglio, 1995). 
LIMITED CAPABILITIES IN EXPLOITING SCALE ECONOMIES:  Indivisibilities and 
limited specialization arising from small size do not bode well for 
competitiveness in an international setting.  The unfortunate results are usually 
higher average costs associated with production, infrastructural development, and 
transportation.  These may serve as disincentives for investment such that costly 
concessions are necessary (Briguglio, 1995; Bernal, 2000). 
LIMITED  SCOPE FOR DOMESTIC  COMPETITION:  Monopolies and oligopolies 
naturally evolve since small economies may have extra difficulty in supporting 
perfectly competitive industries. 
ADMINISTRATIVE  PROBLEMS:  Mediocrity and incompetence are common 
obstacles to efficiency and performance within the civil service.  In some 
instances, human resource levels are inadequate and specialized skills must be 
procured from other countries.  Alleviation of this problem must precede all 
attempts to correct the aforementioned deficiencies.      18
 
In a study of the proposed FTAA (Harker et al., 1996) discussed the implications 
for the Caribbean region with respect to size constraints.  They found an overall 
unpreparedness for regional accession to the FTAA, and argued that CARICOM=s 
interests may be better served in the short run by the adoption of policies aimed at 
correcting major shortcomings.  To reduce transitional costs and enhance participation in 
such agreements, the region must first secure temporary arrangements regarding internal 
policies in prior negotiations, and engage in joint negotiating strategies.  Local 
policymakers must procure the necessary specialized skills to effectively exploit existing 
ambiguities in WTO and FTAA policies.  If this is not done, developed nations and 
organizations may be indirectly empowered to issue edicts that disregard regional 
interests.  Finally, measures must also be undertaken to increase the production of 
exportable goods to mitigate risks associated with limited production ranges (Harker et 
al., 1996).  In spite of these shortcomings however, another study (Armstrong and Read, 
1998) noted several advantages of small size.  Some of these advantages include factors 
such as high degree of social homogeneity, cohesion, and cultural identity.  Although 
theoretically these could create a positive environment for economic development, in 
reality they may not do so.  Instead, they may encourage micro-nationalist biases in 
political policies, which could seriously undermine regionalism and economic progress.  
This particular disadvantage has been highlighted by Dookeran (1995), who argues that 
political division within CARICOM - not economic weakness - is the main contributor to 
regional vulnerability.  This implies that leaders must strive for greater solidarity if long-
run success is to be achieved.  The current CSME underway in the region is a positive 
step in removing this critical bottleneck. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Intra-Group Strategy Implications 
The basic tenets of conventional (Ricardian and Heckscher-Olin-Samuelson) trade theory 
assume that transactions are executed in a perfectly competitive environment, and that 
trade arises from differences in comparative advantage owing to resource or 
technological endowment.  Much of the support in the economics literature for trade 
liberalization is based on this model.  Also, within the context of this theoretical 
framework, small countries are supposed to benefit disproportionately from the opening 
up of trade with larger countries.  This disproportionate accrual of benefits to small states 
is based on the argument that large countries= domestic price structure will dominate in 
the determination of world prices and as such, the structure of incentive that prevails will 
remain unaltered.  In contrast, small countries will experience significantly altered prices,   19
which will lead to increased gains resulting from reallocation of production and 
consumption derived from trade expansion.  A critical assumption underlying this 
argument is that small countries will derive substantially large levels of benefits resulting 
from scale economies associated with expanded trade (Balassa, 1961; McIntyre and 
Gonzales, 2000).  McIntyre and Gonzales (2000) points out that this theoretical 
framework abstracts from adjustment costs and that such costs on both private and social 
accounting bases are disproportionately large for small developing countries.  In the case 
of CARICOM, they conclude among other things, that adjustment costs can significantly 
erode the potential benefits of trade liberalization in the short to medium term.  They 
further argue that, A...this provides a strong rationale for the implementation of 
transitional policies to mitigate the cost of adjustment@.  The study provides a 
comprehensive discussion of the various dimensions of the adjustment costs (McIntyre 
and Gonzales, 2000). 
 
In terms of the focal points of this paper, a critical connection is that economic 
asymmetries foster high adjustment costs within trade liberalization and integration 
movements.  We have been advancing the proposition that these asymmetries and their 
associated adjustment costs are ignored, when in reality they may negatively impact 
participation in the global economy.  The WTO recognizes the need for special treatment 
for developing economies by advocating: (1) longer time periods for the implementation 
of agreements and commitments; (2) stipulations requiring all members to recognize and 
safeguard the interests of developing countries and; (3) financial and technical support to 
build the infrastructure necessary to implement WTO statutes, and technical standards, 
and resolve disputes  (WTO, 2001a).  The underlying objective is to encourage trade 
activities commensurate with developmental goals.  The WTO regime makes no further 
distinction between developing countries as a general group, and small developing 
economies as a sub-set of the general group. 
 
The WTO and FTAA herald the new competitive atmosphere in which CARICOM must 
function.  Full participation will first require a complementary economic and social 
environment at the regional level.  Policies must be formed or strengthened to improve 
competitiveness, reduce socioeconomic adjustment costs, and promote trade reform.   
Since these are inextricably linked, policymakers must be cognizant of the possible 
interactions.   
 
Competitiveness is a function of capital productivity and production flexibility.   
Exploitation of new opportunities will require improvements in these two areas.  The 
issue of freer labor movement within CARICOM must be adequately addressed if 
appropriate supply responses are to be made.  Worker education and training are also   20
crucial.  Increased competition necessitates strengthening of corporate linkages through 
policies that support capital mobility and regional financial integration.   Greater 
involvement in research and development is imperative to develop new products and 
processes for external markets.  Some of these issues are currently being addressed via 
the protocol of the CSME.  However, speedy ratification among member states is 
essential for progress. 
 
The transition to a more competitive environment will entail major social and economic 
costs.  These must be adequately addressed within the appropriate transition policies in 
order to minimize loss.  To compensate for expected losses in tariff revenue, Stotsky et 
al., (2000) recommend member states undertake tax reform policies aimed at broadening 
and strengthening domestic taxation.  They also recommend harmonization of tax 
policies across the region.  Losses to industrial sectors could be minimized through 
policies that emphasize trade reform and improve competitiveness.  Moreover, 
unemployment issues can be addressed through free movement of labor and capital 
within the region. 
 
Trade reform is of paramount importance.  Barclay et al. (2001) give explicit direction in 
this regard by stating:  A...the Region [CARICOM] should consciously seek to wean itself 
away from the taste for preferences, and should explore initiatives in trade negotiations 
and trade diplomacy with a focus towards taking a definitive shift to improve its 
commercial presence, and to keep itself abreast of knowledge on marketing, distribution 
and technology@.  CARICOM must focus on trade promotion, foreign market creation 
and market penetration
10.  In an analysis of policy imperatives, Bernal (1994) pointed to 
the need for reorientation of exports toward the services sector.  The significant growth in 
this area between 1994 and 1998 gives credence to Bernal=s position.    
 
The aforementioned strategies will embody deeper CARICOM integration.  In 
recognition of this, regional leaders recently ratified the CARICOM charter via the nine 
protocols of the CSME to improve coordination of macro economic policies (CARICOM 
Secretariat, 2002b).  Clearly, it is a start, but must be followed through with actual 
implementation of policy goals and objectives.   
 
Inter-Group Strategy Implications 
                                                 
10Market access is not synonymous with market entry.  The latter is achieved 
through active and deliberate efforts to penetrate the market.
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The preceding discussion reveals an urgency for explicit recognition and treatment of 
economic asymmetries due to size constraints, given the fact that SDT and non-
reciprocity treatments are likely to receive limited applicability in future agreements 
given the direction of trade negotiations.  In addition to policy adjustment strategies at the 
national and intra-CARICOM levels, changes must also be made at the international or 
inter-group levels.
11  According to Bernal (2000), the specialized circumstances of small 
economies will require multifaceted transition provisions and short term preferential 
treatment along the following lines: 
 
LOWER LEVELS OF OBLIGATIONS:  Smaller economies should only be required 
to undertake/implement concessions and commitments that are commensurate 
with their current development, adjustment capacity, and economic needs.     
Negotiations must be done on an >issue-by-issue= basis, and must incorporate 
policies that foster international competitiveness while reducing the costs of 
adjustment.  Exemptions in investment and domestic support may be required. 
ASYMMETRICALLY  PHASED  IMPLEMENTATION  TIMETABLES:  Existing 
developmental disparities between CARICOM and other countries necessitate 
different adjustment periods.  Concessions similar to those afforded other 
countries in the past could be considered, for example - Mexico under NAFTA.   
BEST ENDEAVOR COMMITMENTS:  Developed economies must adopt measures 
that provide temporary easement.  For example, special consideration could be 
given prior to the imposition of duties, and other forms of taxation that affect 
small economies. 
FLEXIBILITY IN APPLICATION OF DISCIPLINES:  Trade rules should be relaxed in 
the short run to allow temporary usage of trade restrictions, so as to lessen 
problems associated with balance of payments and infant industry development. 
ENABLING  ACCESS TO MEDIATION:  Small states have limited 
institutional/economic capabilities to utilize the Dispute Settlement mechanisms 
of the WTO.  Larger economies could provide expertise in this area. 
                                                 
11Some inter-group adjustments are being made that could have significant 
implications for CARICOM countries.  For example, the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement 
signed in June 2000, replaces the twenty-five years of cooperation under four successive 
Lomé Conventions with a new structure of trade and development assistance between the 
two groups.  CARICOM countries are quite apprehensive about the economic impacts of 
this regime on their economies.
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TECHNICAL  ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING:  Schemes must complement the 
adjustment process, and promote capacity building.  Assistance with WTO and 
FTAA negotiations/obligations could facilitate timely implementation. 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The fact that the WTO and FTAA trade regimes link economies with great 
developmental disparities cannot be disputed.  The adjustment costs that are subsequently 
incurred from such linkage are likely to be great.  This has already been recognized and 
articulated to some degree by the granting of greater transitional time frame for 
commitment compliance and the granting of special waiver for SDT by the WTO.   
Similar concessions should be crafted within the FTAA, and it would be reasonable for 
CARICOM to actively negotiate such concession up front.  Apart from effectively 
facilitating the region=s participation in the hemispheric integration RTA, it would permit 
proper economic and institutional adjustment.  It would also significantly reduce the 
inevitable >shocks= B since CARICOM would be making the transition from a relatively 
highly protected to a competitive environment.  However, from both theoretical and 
practical points of view, such considerations probably would be best if they do not last 
into perpetuity, but must have definite time/target constraints.  This suggestion is based 
on some theoretical cum observational assessment that great economic inefficiencies are 
likely to arise when protective umbrellas are given into perpetuity. 
 
Acquiring temporary SDT status within multilateral trade arrangements is merely one 
challenge facing CARICOM.  Another major challenge comes from within.  From all 
indications, significant progress must be made in terms of deepening regional integration 
such that benefits can be gained from liberalized trade.  In addition to increasing 
productivity, developing service and value-added industries, and enabling freer 
movement of capital and labor, CARICOM must maintain its integrity.  The CSME is a 
step in the direction; but speed is of the essence and the process is taking too long.  
Should the proposed FTAA widen economic asymmetries between the region and other 
countries such that they cannot be adequately addressed, the subsequent socioeconomic 
instability, and political division could threaten the very existence of the group. 
 
We are aware that the conventional counter-argument given to SDT is that they 
intrinsically distort competition in trade relations.  This assertion however, is not 
universally embraced by economists and trade analysts.  In fact, many trade analysts 
asserts that the anti-SDT argument is only valid in cases where preferences are targeted to 
specific activities.  In cases where SDT general mechanisms are based on economic   23
asymmetries between countries, the argument may not be valid.  We subscribe to the 
latter position.  Thus, within this context we support the SELA (1997) conclusion that, 
“The incorporation of special treatment according to level of development within a 
general legal framework would in fact prevent modalities being applied that do distort 
competition@. 
 
Finally, the importance of information in a competitive environment cannot be over 
emphasized.  There is an urgent need for data capture and dissemination.  Poor quality 
and/or lack of data are major limitations of regional studies, and affect the formulation of 
sensible policies.  If CARICOM is ever to recognize its full potential, this problem must 
be resolved.   Within this context, high priority must be accorded to trade data collection, 
processing, evaluation, and dissemination within CARICOM.  Also, the CARICOM 
Secretariat, Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and the Caribbean Regional 
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a GDP data in nominal terms. 
b Excluding data for Haiti.  See footnote 3 of text for clarification. 
Source:  Caribbean Publishing Company (2002).   30
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a  All values in nominal terms, except as noted. 
Source:  Caribbean Publishing Co. (2002); CGCED (1999); UNCTAD (2000); World Bank (2001).   32




































































































































































































































a Data are for 1990, except stated otherwise. 
b 1992 data. 
Source:  Caribbean Publishing (2002); CDB (2000); Kairi Consultants, Ltd. (1999, a, b).   34
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Source:  Caribbean Publishing Co. (2002); CIA (2001). 
 